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When the output of a product that has been the basis of subsistence and social 
reproduction - as rice has been in Asia - expands, the marketed surplus rises 
disproportionately to the growth rate of production.  Post harvest activities that were 
part and parcel of the reproductive activity of household labour (in the hands and 
under the feet of women – even if under the control of men) then also become 
commercialised. Firms expand in number and labour markets sprout up as firms 
become differentiated in size, scale and activity. Food security comes to depend not 
only on the market but also on the social and political structures in which markets are 
embedded. One of these social structures is gender. 
 
Two aspects of this gendered process are explored in this essay. The first is 
‘productive deprivation’ which was  argued by Ester Boserup to be the most notable 
impact of development on women. Using field evidence comparatively from four 
regions of South Asia from the 1970s to the present, the impact of the waves of 
technological change accompanying concentration and differentiation in rice markets 
is shown to be strongly net labour displacing and strongly biased against female 
labour. Nevertheless productive deprivation is class specific and masculinisation still 
co-exists with a high general level of female economic participation. To start to 
explain why productive deprivation is class specific the essay offers a development of 
Ursula Huws’ theory of commodification and its impact on women in advanced 
capitalist conditions -  elaborating it for conditions of mass poverty. Poverty is shown 
to limit the relevance of this gendered theory. Poverty is also an important reason for 
the persistence of petty commodity production and trade and petty service provision. 
Under petty production women are either self employed or unwaged family workers 
for men who are themselves not fully independent but frequently dependent on money 
advances from commercial capital. Evidence from West Bengal in the 1990s - where 
the growth of rice production has eased up - shows by contrast that the process of 
commodification has not eased up at all. Products, by-products, intermediate and 
investment goods, waste, public goods, state regulative resources and labour are all 
relentlessly commodified. The process creates livelihoods mainly for young, low caste 
men. Low caste women dominate itinerant retailing, directly dependent on money 
advances from male wholesalers. Women are being displaced from the rice mill 
labour forces in which economies of scale are pitched against unwaged work in petty 
production. The subordinated status and double work burden of women in petty 
production is well known, as is their economic dependence and social insecurity. 
(rice - masculinisation – commodification – comparative regional analysis – 
comparative institutional analysis) 
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1. Introduction 
For forty years the production of rice grew worldwide at rates greater than that of 
population. Rice production more than doubled – from about 265 m tonnes in 1961 to 
about  560  in  2001
1.  When  the  output  of  a  product  that  has  been  the  basis  of 
subsistence and social reproduction - as rice has been in Asia - expands, the marketed 
surplus  rises  disproportionately  to  the  growth  rate  of  production.  Post  harvest 
activities that were part and parcel of the reproductive activity of household labour (in 
the hands and under the feet of women – even if under the control of men) then also 
become commercialised. Firms expand in number and labour markets sprout up as 
firms become differentiated in size, scale and activity
2. In a value chain or marketing 
system, a range of technologies, scales, kinds of organisation and regulative norms 
and practices co-exist in a stable fashion. ). Food security comes to depend not only 
on the market but also on the social and political structures in which markets are 
embedded.  Gender  relations  pervade  these  regulative  social  structures.  While  the 
gender division of tasks in rice production in India shows a structural diversity 
3, that 
of the post harvest system appears from existing evidence to be much less diverse. 
One of the strongest patterns in the post-harvest system takes the form of a trend. 
While the absolute number of female livelihoods generated in the post-harvest system 
may be decreasing, static or increasing, the proportion relative to those of men is 
declining  over  time.  Control  over  commercial  assets  is  dominated  by  men  and 
technological  change  displaces  female  labour  disproportionately  to  that  of  men 
(Harriss-White, 2004a).  
 
This  essay  is  an  exploratory  reflection  on  the  process  of  masculinisation  of  the 
markets  and  the  post-harvest  system  for  rice.  It  is  a  social  process  that  was  first 
modelled in general terms and descriptively as early as 1972 by the Danish economist 
Ester Boserup. She even gave it a name: productive deprivation. In this essay, first it 
will  be  argued  that  Boserup’s  productive  deprivation  is  class  specific  and  that 
masculinisation co-exists with a high level of female economic participation. Second, 
it is found that the process of proliferation of markets and commodities is instituted in 
ways which have perpetuated petty scales of production and unwaged women’s work 
in conditions of economic and social insecurity.  
 
 
2. Commercialisation and Productive Deprivation 
 
‘Economic  and  social  development  unavoidably  entails  the  disintegration  of  the 
division of labour among the two sexes traditionally established in the village. With 
modernisation of agriculture and with migration to the towns, a new sex pattern of 
productive work must emerge, for better or worse. The obvious danger is, however, 
that  in  the  course  of  this  transition  women  will  be  deprived  of  their  productive 
functions, and the whole process of growth will thereby be retarded’ wrote Boserup  
(1989, p5).  
 
                                                 
1 Rai 2003 
2 A rice marketing firm may do one or a combination of the following activities: buy, sell and broker, 
store transport and process, and finance production, trade and post-harvest processing. Instead of being 
patterned, the activity profile of firms studied so far in India show tendencies towards complexity, 
diversity and uniqueness (Harriss-White, 1996) 
3 Mencher and Saradamoni, 1982; Kapadia, 1993; Jackson and Palmer-Jones, 1998, Jackson, 1999 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 3 
   
The process of deprivation  proceeds from the agriculturalisation of the peasantry and 
the  stripping  of  crafts  from  the  work  of  agricultural  households.  Craft  production 
becomes  specialised.  It  increases  in  scale,  production  being  organised  either  in 
households (and according to household  divisions of task and authority)  or through 
male  wage  labour.    As  the  division  of  labour  deepens  and  exchange  becomes 
fundamental to social reproduction so tasks are progressively defined by categories of 
worker, in which skilled categories are dominated by men (op.cit. pp 69-76). Boserup 
then shifts set to towns. South Asian towns are male domains, either through selective 
male migration or because of  the seclusion of women, or both. The prospects for 
women’s work in towns is related to the rural gender division of labour in the non-
farm economy so that while in north India ‘men even do the shopping’ (op.cit. p 86), 
in the south, in what she recognises as the ‘semi-male town’, retail trade may be in the 
hands of women. However, ‘to most Hindus the idea of female participation in trade 
is an abomination’ (op. cit. p 87) 
4 and ‘modern sector’ bureaucracy, industry and 
markets  are  dominated  by  men.  Even  in  South  India,  she  observed  a  ‘deepening 
cultural resistance to women’s participation in trade’ (op. cit. p 98). Female work is 
then confined to unsecluded women from the lowest castes who provide artisanal, 
home-based, petty production plus a variety of services. Boserup shows convincingly 
that  women  are  progressively  marginalised  from  wage  work  in  factories  and  that 
female  activity  rates decline with development  (op.cit. p 192).
5 Both demand and 
supply factors play their role in this. Employment regulations for women increase 
their cost while the inflexibility of modern industrial discipline is incompatible with 
the rearing of children (op.cit. pp 110-17).
6  She reaches a powerful conclusion.  ‘If 
women are hired at all... it is usually for the unskilled, low-wage jobs, men holding 
skilled jobs. Thus the roles assigned to men and women even in the modern sector 
indicate a widening difference between the productivity and earnings of each’ (op. cit. 
pp 139-40). 
 
Boserup  brought  broad  brush  global  evidence  to  bear  on  her  thesis.  Given  the 
spectacular  growth  of  female  employment  in  the  Indian  service  sector,  to  test  for 
productive  deprivation  within  a  single  commodity-branch  of  the  Indian  economy 
might  be  considered  inappropriately  restrictive.  Yet  rice  is  the  most  important 
agricultural  commodity  and  a  fundamental  part  of  India’s  agrarian  structure,  food 
culture and food security. The steps involved in the marketing, processing, storage 




3. The commercialisation and masculinisation of the post harvest system  
 
There is rather little evidence about the gendering of the rice markets of India. What 
exists is not continuous in time, it is patchy in space and the product of individualistic 
                                                 
4 By this Boserup even then must have meant upper caste Hindus. 
5 This process of marginalisation continues to this day (Hensman, 2000), despite the rise in female 
employment in S. Asian export processing zones. 
6 Demand disincentives include rules on maternity benefits, child care and equal pay. Supply 
disincentives include fixed working hours and the location of sites. Pearson (1994, pp339-58) 
comments critically that employment regulations do not act as disincentives where they have no reach 
in the vast informal sectors of developing economics. Nor are sites and times a constraint under flexible 
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research  methodologies.  It  can  however  be  used  to  explore  the  questions  of 
masculinisation and of productive deprivation. First, the class positioning of women 
will be examined using evidence for Tamil Nadu and West Bengal in the 1980s and 
1990s
7. Second, the impact of technical change on such institutional arrangements 
will be explored with evidence from Bangladesh in the late 1970s, Tamil Nadu in the 
1980s, and West Bengal and Punjab in the current era
8. 
 
3.1 Female Participation and Class Positions towards the end of the 20
th Century  
Grain markets are strongly regulated through gender relations.  Women participate in 
paddy-rice markets in four ways, according to their caste and class position.   
 
i) Women from pauperised, female, female-headed and/or low caste petty producing 
and trading households are confined to seasonal operation, to subsistence orientation 
(and  to  the  simple  reproduction  of  their  households),  to  particular  positions  and 
activities  within  the  post-harvest  system  (especially  processing  and  retailing), 
localised territorial linkages, weekly marketplace sites and unlicensed and/or illegal 
transactions in cash rather than on credit. Their participation is conditioned by the life 
cycle and when children are no longer dependent, these women tend to stop trading. 
They experience marketplaces as physically dirty and ritually polluting places; so they 
regard non-participation as ‘development’. 
 
ii) Female casual wage workers from the assetless class form the largest substratum 
of  labour  in  grain  milling  and  premilling  processing.  In  South  India,  marketing 
systems rest on the backs of these women; they form from 40 - 60% of the labour 
force
9. The average mill employs 15 but up to 70 have been encountered
10. Outcaste 
women are allowed to turn paddy on the large drying yards because the kernel is still 
protected  from  ritual  pollution  by  its  husk.  Women  are  debarred  from  being  mill 
mechanics and it is unusual to find them handling heavy consignments of scalding 
paddy during the parboiling process. Female coolie
11 is prevalently but incorrectly 
regarded  by  mill  owners  as  a  household  supplement  for  their  employees.    Wage 
differentials of two thirds to a half that of male wages in rice mills in no way reflect 
gendered productivity. (In any case this would be tantamount to impossible accurately 
to measure since the division of tasks in milling is sex-sequential.) Female mill work 
is almost everywhere deliberately casualised. The sexual harassment of the mill work 
force by management is not unknown. 
 
iii) In smaller family firms, unwaged female family members have provided that part 
of the wage to labour in trading firms which takes the form of prepared food. (With 
the commercialisation of labour, however, the practice of payment in tea and meals is 
dying, or itself being commercialised).  The female family labour of a rice milling and 
trading firm will almost certainly "subsidise" some of the costs of reproduction of 
their  male  labour  –  force  such  that  the  social  reproduction  of  male  labour  is  not 
entirely born by female labour within working class households.  
 
                                                 
7 Harriss, 1993; Harriss-White, 1996, 1999 
8 Harriss, 1979; Harriss-White, forthcoming; Ghosh and Sudarshan 2004; Kaur 2004 
9 Harriss-White, 1996, Table 7.1 , p 266 
10 The female casual labour force can number up to 700 in cotton ginning and wholesaling firms (see 
Harriss-White, 1996,ch7). 
11 “Coolie” in Tamil means wages for casual labour QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 5 
   
iv) A typical milling and trading firm is owned by the males of a joint family and 
practises  a  diversity  of  trading  and  transformation  activities,  as  a  consequence  of 
which  there  is  a  complex  of  patriarchal  relations  between  of  male  family  labour 
together with the hiring of a permanent male labour force and casual labour of both 
sexes.
12 Women in large milling and trading firm-families are used for the caste-based 
reproduction and expansion of firms first by means of their dowries on marriage and 
second (but rarely) through the  practice of fictitious (benami) registration of a trading 
company in a woman' s name, generally for the purposes of tax avoidance.  In the first 
case,  the  higher  education  of  such  women  is  a  good  example  of  the  economic 
inefficiency of gender institutions. For such women, education is a status good and 
leads  neither  to  economic  participation  nor  control  over  assets  or  over  major 
economic decisions.
13 Women are positioned according to a paradigm of service and 
subordination in which their piety s factored into a business family’s reputation.
14 The 
prevalent lack of ownership or control over property or over any collateral which 
determine  creditworthiness  makes  the  economic  role  of  women  belonging  to  the 
accumulating oligopolies an indirect one, in contrast to the role of poor women in 
petty trade and the casual labour force. It is clear that women in business families do 
indeed experience the productive deprivation of which Boserup wrote. However, in 
almost the entire post-Independence period – and with few exceptions throughout the 
subcontinent – India’s rice markets have depended on low caste female toil while the 





Institutional change is argued by  orthodox institutional economists such as Oliver 
Williamson (1985) to be driven by changes in relative prices, which themselves may 
be the consequence of technological change or transfers. Of this process of technical 
change Partha Dasgupta predicts: “Where household demand for goods and services 
reflects male concerns, we would expect technological inventions in farm equipment 
and techniques of production to be forthcoming in response. Where cultivation is a 
male  activity…we  would  not  observe  much  in  the  way  of  process  innovation  in 
threshing, winnowing, grinding grain and preparing food.” (1993, p 335).  Three case 
studies will be used to interrogate the relationships between technical change, prices 
and gendered institutional change : Bangladesh in the late 1970s, Tamil Nadu in the 
1980s and W. Bengal and Punjab in the early 21
st century. 
                                                 
12 Harriss-White, 1996. Male family labour (up to 13 members have been encountered) whose work is 
loosely  specified,  may  work  part-time  or  seasonally  or  as  part  of  a  multiple  occupational  profile. 
Permanent workers (averaging 3 but up to 7, whose task specification may be quite refined but whose 
terms and conditions are varied) may work at the simultaneous performance of more than one activity 
within the firm and also on their own account. Rates of pay are unsystematised, and accentuated by 
both patronage and debt bondage. Male casual labour (averaging 9 but up to 40) may be permanently 
attached to a trading firm but employed on a daily, weekly, seasonal, group contract or piece rate basis 
for manual work.  While tasks are highly specified, contracts, terms and conditions, and rates of pay 
vary greatly. Lastly, male child labour is used at key points in the grain marketing system (messages, 
carrying food and drink for negotiations, cleaning), and may be paid secure though very low wages.  
For some children, such work is an apprenticeship (though there is no reason why such apprenticeships 
should replace formal school because the children of rich traders participate in both activities). 
13 Female education leads to the lowering of birth rates (though not to reduced gender discrimination in 
regions of South Asia where this is practised (Das Gupta, 1987; Jeffery and Jeffery, 1998).  But it is 
primary rather than tertiary education which achieves this result. 
14 See for example Laidlaw’s 1995 study of Jain families. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 6 
   
 
3.2.1. Bangladesh in 1978: the first long wave of labour displacement 
As late as the late 1970s, two thirds of Bangladesh’s paddy was milled by women (in 
their homesteads (baris)) by means of the foot operated wooden hammer mill (the 
dheki). One to two women could de-husk a maund (37.3 kgs) a day. Women were also  
completely responsible for pre milling processing
15. Parboiling originated as a form of 
short term under-water storage when paddy was harvested during the monsoon. It also 
gelatinizes the rice kernel – with many nutritional benefits
16. Since one woman could 
process 4-5 maunds a day, dheki husking was the constraint on the scale, a fact of no 
great significance while the preparation of paddy was simply for subsistence of other 
processes. Women also winnowed and organised the use and disposal of husk and 
bran. Not all this labour was unwaged. Estimates vary according to the region but 
between  5%  and  60%  of  households  hired  women  out  –  and  about  15-20  %  of 
households  hired  women  in  for  the  production  of  rice  for  subsistence.  Paddy  -
processing  wage-labour  was  paid  in  combinations  of  cash,  rice  and  meals.  These 
labouring  women  were  among  the  most  disadvantaged:  pauperised  widows, 
divorcees, and wives of sick and / or landless husbands.
17 In the late 70s, roughly 2.7 
million woman-years of employment was estimated to be generated by the domestic 
processing of paddy for the population of 20 m working women 
18. 
 
By the late 70s, about 20% of paddy production passed through small huller mills (the 
‘Lewis Grant huller’, adapted in the early 20th century from a coffee grinder).  The 
huller  was  cost  effective  and  being  diffused  widely  in  the  subcontinent  following 
state-regulated rural electrification. Huller mills were growing at 7% p.a., sustaining 
local  “innovation  rents”  with  rates  of  return  averaging  70%.  These  mills  were 
operated by men who supervised a team of up to 10 women working on the drying 
yard, sieving the residues and separating husk and bran. The money costs of hulling 
were one 12
th that of dheki processing. Productivity per women in the hulling mill was 
up to 33 times that of the dheki and in pre-milling processing was 1.5 times that of the 
bari. The result was a large scale net social displacement of labour. The first wave of 
mechanised  technology  was  the  most  female-labour-displacing  of  all  because  it 
replaced foot-operated machines (or elsewhere in South Asia the hand operated pestle 
and mortars) worked entirely by women
19. This uncelebrated process destroyed tens 
of millions of seasonal livelihoods for women in the subcontinent. 
  
3.2.2 Tamil Nadu in the 1980s: the second wave 
The modernization of rice milling is less well known than the Green Revolution in 
production,  but  the  two  processes  happened  side  by  side.  Since  the  late  1960s, 
technical  change  in  rice  processing  has  involved  foreign  transfers  and  imports  of 
technology developed for the radically different '  factor endowments and ratios'  of the 
U.S.  and  Japan.  This  was  both  preceded  and  accompanied  by  foreign  technical 
                                                 
15 Soaking (up to 48 hours), parboiling in small batches ( 30 minutes to 3 hours) drying – raking and 
bird-scaring- ( 1 to 3 days) (Harriss, 1979). 
16Parboiling insures against the vagaries of rainfall; it reduces the proportion of broken rice grains and 
raises the rice recovery to 72%; the kernel absorbs proteins, vitamins and minerals and the bran layer 
absorbs oil; the kernel becomes more resistant to pests in storage and loses fewer solids to gruel in 
cooking. 
17 Arens and Van Beurden 1977; Wood 76; Adnan, 1976 
18 Harriss, 1979 
19 The distress consequent to displacement is most acute in the north of the subcontinent, see Greeley, 
1987. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 7 
   
assistance (the quality of whose scientific advice left a great deal to be desired
20) and 
domestic  Indian legislation outlawing the ‘indigenous’ technology of the huller in 
1970 (Harriss and Kelly, 1982). Blinkered technical appraisals, indicating that the 
new technology increased the productivity of both capital and labour, wrenched mills 
from their institutional and logistical contexts and led to the adoption/imposition of 
imported  packages.  The  package  included  bulk  parboiling  (sometimes  pressure-
parboiling), conveyor-belt transport, paddy cleaning, rubber-roll shelling and cone-
polishing. State institutions (co-operatives  and  parastatals) regulated these Modern 
Rice Mills (MRMs), but in isolation from the other state and private institutions of 
finance, pricing, procurement and logistics upon which the package had to depend. 
The low capacity utilisation and higher per unit marketing and processing costs that 
were the inevitable early result led to their long term dependence upon state subsidies.   
 
In India as a whole, meanwhile, wherever a marketed surplus was being generated, 
the ‘illegal’ huller had expanded in numbers  - from about 34,000 in the early 60s to 
over 100,000 in the early 80s 
21.  Replacing female labour by non-renewable energy 
priced at levels which reduced processing costs and increased labour productivity, the 
huller restricted demand for female wage workers to drying paddy and attending to 
the mill (Table 1). The introduction of the Modern Rice Mill - under state patronage 
and unable to compete against the huller without state subsidy - generated the second 
wave of labour displacement. Like the first, this was also disproportionately biased 
against women  – as seen in Table 1.  Small and doubtful gains in technical efficiency 
have clearly been made at the expense of the most vulnerable segments of society, 
who can least forego employment (Harriss, 1976). 
 
' The market'  resisted the original technological package (a rational response) but has 
over the  years adopted  the techniques of ‘Modern Rice Milling’ in stages and by 
component. This has resulted in economies of scale and accentuated the structural 
concentration of ownership of assets in marketing systems. These assets are male -
controlled.  
 
3.3.3 West Bengal in the 21
st century: the third wave  
By the start of the 21
st century the (no doubt under-estimated) India-wide distribution 
of hullers and modern mills  was extremely uneven – see Table 2. In the largest rice 
producing state – W. Bengal -  only 9% of mills were modern ones; in the southern 
rice-producing  belt  the  proportions  of  MRMs  varied  from  16-60%;  in  the  rice 
exporting belt of the north west MRMs accounted for 30% of mill numbers in Punjab 
and 55% in Haryana; while in Bihar they amounted to 1%. The regional distribution 
of technologies matters because of its consequences for female livelihoods. While to 
my knowledge there is no rigorous research explaining this distribution, the factors 
that might need taking into account include the agrarian structure which generates the 
marketed  surpluses  supplying  MRMs,  shapes  demand  for  custom  milling  for 
subsistence and even shapes residual demand for pounded rice; the location of final 
demand (in the northwest, rice tends to be an ‘inedible’ cash crop which is bulked for 
relatively  large  scale  processing  and  export  to  other  regions);  the  extent  of  state 
subsidies;  and  the  regulation  of  the  relation  between  MRMs  and  the  public 
distribution system.  
                                                 
20 Harriss 1976; Pacey and Payne 1984 
21 Gita Sen uses the Bulletin of Food Statistics to indicate 91,000 mills in 1975, (Sen , 1983, p22)  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 8 
   
 
In W. Bengal, rice mills currently process a rough estimate of 20-25 % of production, 
about half of which is sold to the Public Distribution System. Changes in the labour 
process  in  rice  mills  are  differentiating  this  economically  powerful  sub  sector  of 
MRMs. The ratio of family labour to other kinds is increasing. The displacement of 
wage workers  is reducing the total wage labour force to a greater extent than the 
tendency to professionalise the tasks carried out by family members has added to it. 
The absolute numbers of regular, salaried or ‘permanent’ labour has declined by 50% 
in the period 1990–2002. Some 70% of labour is now on casual contracts (only half of 
which  are  thought  to  be  registered  on  Muster  Rolls  and  therefore  eligible  for 
Provident Funds or Employees State Insurance
22). Unions do not claim labour rights 
under the framework of the Labour Laws. Instead they negotiate directly with bosses 
about contingent rights at work and organise resistance to incremental lay-offs. Their 
limited set of insecure rights varies from region to region. Labour supply is regulated 
by  ethnicity,  and  labour  compliance  through  the  use  of  physically  oppressive 
technology which ensures submissive behaviour. 
 
The  latest  technological  components  (husk-fired  mechanical  driers  (HFMID))  
substitute for the free public good of the sunshine, reduce the pre-milling processing 
from 3-5 days to 24 hours and increase the milling season from 250-300 days to the 
entire working year. While enabling the harvest to be de-linked from the cycles of the 
monsoons and helping supply to keep pace with the appetite of the mill, the weather-
proofing technology  also satisfies the need to  work at high capacity  utilisation to 
cover  the  increased  fixed  costs  component  in  ever  more  highly  capital  intensive 
ancillary  machinery.  MRMs  are  still  eligible  for  subsidised  loans  for  technical 
upgrades. HFMD have had a massive impact on the labour process (see  Table 3), the 
burden of displacement being borne entirely by female casual labour. This on-going 
displacement also pre-empts the organisation of female labour. Even though wages 
paid to casual labour are gender-neutral, the system is increasingly male.  
 
Women are still found working without wages for the homestead based pre-milling 
processing of custom-milled subsistence rice; and female labour markets have started 
to  be  formed  for  the  same  physical  process  on  the  slightly  scaled  up  micro-
conglomerates of capital that are forming in and around the huller mills. Hullers have 




3.2.4 Punjab in the 21
st century: an almost completely masculine labour process 
By contrast, only 2-3 % of production goes through custom mills in Punjab, the rest 
passing  through  rice  mills.  Most  of  these  operate  on  contract  to  a  range  of  state 
trading agencies – see Table 4
24. Since the 1960s, Punjab has been a significant net 
contributor to the Public Distribution System. The system of rice mills is stratified by 
caste  and  by  regulative  framework  (a  minority  being  owned  and  managed  by  co-
operatives, basmati mills being owned by Hindu business castes while a minority of 
contract mills have been set up using Sikh agrarian capital). The labour process has 
                                                 
22 Labour regards this as a tax because so few are able to redeem it at 60 if they live that long. 
23 Harriss-White, forthcoming 
24 rice mills in Punjab mill basmati rice exclusively for export while some 1900 are agents for FCI, 
PUNSUP, Markfed, Punjab Food and Civil Supplies Dept and ancillary industries owned by the State 
and Central Warehousing Corporations (Kaur 2004). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 9 
   
developed as almost entirely male.  It shows extremes of differentiation (Table 5). 
Annual returns in 2002 vary from Rs 4 –11.2 crores per business family in the basmati 
export sector down to Rs 17,000 for male rice mill labour – a factor of roughly 1000: 
1. By far the biggest component of the labour force (86%) consists of casual, rightless 
male wage labour, unentitled to Bonuses, Provident Fund, Employees State Insurance 
or Diwali perks. Wages are agreed through mutual collusion in Trade Associations 
and without consultation with labour. The Minimum Wage (Rs 85) is paid - but on 
piece rate for a day of about 12 hours rather than the 8 stipulated in law. Almost all 
such labour is from the landless agricultural labouring class, from Backward Castes, 
Scheduled  Castes  and  Tribes  originating  from  Bihar  and  Eastern  UP.  Organised 
through kinship and locality and recruited in groups via contractors, the labour force 
is disciplined through a combination of on-site residence and debt. The continuum of 
work status required by rice mills (Tables 4 and 5) thinly disguises the fact that the 
vast  majority  of  the  labour  force  is  working  on  informal  and  insecure  terms  and 
conditions - with no rights to work, at work or to social security. Women, invisible in 
Punjab, absent from the accounts of milling costs, located in villages from which 
migrant mill workers originate, are key not only to the intergenerational reproduction 
of this labour but also to its day to day maintenance ‘in time of need’ when workers 
are incapacitated from work, income plunges and they are forced home. 
 
To  sum  up:  Pace  Dasgupta,  these  comparative  analyses  of  the  dynamics  of  rice 
processing show that massive technological change and process innovation has taken 
place  in  the  female  activities  of  ‘grinding  grain’  and  ‘preparing  food’.  Against 
Williamson’s hypothesis, masculinisation is not a rational response to relative prices. 
The  newest  technical  components  are  only  cost-effective  at  market  prices  under 
conditions of high capacity utilisation which are difficult to achieve without logistical 
and price support (subsidies) from the state. Yet, inexorably, they are being adopted in 
the  very  reverse  of  a  green-revolutionary  development
25.  While  Douglass  North, 
acknowledging  workers’  agency,  has  hypothesised  that  technology  is  generally 
adopted so as to maximise the use of lesser skilled workers who do not have the 
bargaining  power  to  disrupt  production  (1990,  p  65),  the  case  studies  show  that 
technology and modes of organisation are transferred which do away with precisely 
those people least capable of bargaining or of withholding labour - female labour. 
This is hard to explain. The expulsion of armies of low caste women from the rice 
markets  may  be  more  of  a  status-reducing  expression  of  the  contaminating  caste 
relations of a merchant than it is a status-enhancing expression of patriarchy.  
 
While the post-harvest activities of north-western regions, of strategic importance to 
the  state-regulated  food  security  system,  have  always  been  highly  masculine,  the 
question remains: what work do the women whose livelihoods are displaced find ?  
 
In the first case considered here, dheki operating women and their households faced a 
major food security crisis – one no less serious for being dispersed in time and space. 
The dheki labour displaced in Bangladesh in the late 70s and 80s found  exiguous 
work making quilts, grinding tobacco or tending poultry 
26. In the complete absence 
of social security, so many took to begging that the state expanded Food for Work 
infrastructure schemes  - at times with foreign food aid. The rice mill labour being 
                                                 
25 A revolutionary component should increase output per unit of input and thus lower total costs per 
unit of output. 
26 See Greeley, 1987 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 10 
   
displaced  at  present  in  W.  Bengal  seeks  refuge  in  employment  in  brick  kilns,  in 
construction  and  in  the  residual  shock  absorber  –  agriculture.  There  is  now 
overwhelming evidence that S. Asian agriculture is being feminised (Kapadia and 
Lerche, 1999). Pace early predictions about the female-labour-displacing impact of 
mechanisation in paddy cultivation 
27, this earlier trend is being reversed and it is 
male labour that tends to be displaced 
28. This widely noted feminisation has been 
attributed  to  the  male  labour  displacing  impact  of  mechanisation  in  lift  irrigation, 
ploughing and harvesting; to male withdrawal from joint tasks performed by both 
genders; to increasing local off-farm income-earning opportunities for men
29; and to 
the tendency for men temporarily to migrate in search of work (women often being 
prevented from doing this by child care and other gender-inelastic, domestic work). 
From the argument of this essay, it is not simply that male off-farm livelihoods are 
pulling men from agriculture, it is that the displacement of women from female off-
farm livelihoods is pushing them back to agriculture and helping to depress female 
wages  there 
30.  Most  definitely  marginalized    from  rice  processing,  they  are  not 
necessarily and always marginalized from productive activity; but their incorporation 
is on adverse terms. 
 
3.3. Conclusion: Masculinisation and productive deprivation in rice processing 
 
This research confirms that men are consolidating their hold over the economic power 
points  in  rice  markets  and  that  women  in  elite  business  families  are  egregious 
examples  of  productive  deprivation.  Boserup  predicted  a  widening  gender  gap  in 
productivity, which is confirmed in this sector study. So is another gap she did not 
examine: a greater range in the returns available to male livelihoods in rice markets – 
in Punjab up to 1000:1. However while Boserup’s theory was society-wide, the case 
material shows that women still provide much more than ‘artisanal…production and a 
variety of services’ (1989, p192). In regions of southern India they still provide the 
bulk of the wage work force. Though the regions of the North West have always had a 
masculine labour force, elsewhere, each wave of incremental technical change has led 
to the net displacement of labour, but has been biased hugely against casual female 
labour. Whether or not  this displacement destroys livelihoods or  ‘merely’  reduces 
drudgery does not only depend on the degree of commercialisation of the product. It 
also depends on the extent to which the labour relations of post-harvest processing 
have  themselves  become  commercialised.  Where  it  destroys  livelihoods  in  rice 
processing, women are pushed out into work on casual contracts and usually at under-
nourishing rates of pay.
31  
                                                 
27 See Mencher 1985 
28Da Corta and Venateshwarlu 1999. The precise gendered impact will depend on the tasks 
mechanised, the prior gender division of labour and that associated with any change in cropping 
pattern. 
29 There are strong barriers to female entry into the ‘non farm rural economy’ – whether it is mining of 
weaving and especially when migration is necessary for wage work. And export processing zones, 
where female labour is incorporated into the most oppressive work in global value chains (Jackson and 
Pearson, 1999)  still create a relatively small proportion of a developing country’s livelihoods. 
30 One of the hypotheses considered for the period of the 30s to the 60s by Gita Sen (1983). 
31 The jury is still out over the debates on whether lower pay for women than for men reflects 
productivity (impossible to verify in sex sequential production systems) – or whether it reflects supply 
conditions where work is a residual which needs to be compatible with the priors of household 
reproductive tasks  – or whether markets, rather than being liberating, are an independent field of 
patriarchal oppression or a combination of these factors. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 11 
   
 
The state aids and abets this process. It uses the carrot of incentives (subsidies for 
technological  upgrading,  which  concentrate  assets  and  differentiate  the  labour 
process). It uses the stick of disciplinary regulation (outlawing an appropriate milling 
technology until recently); and it creates a nexus of rents which sustains a structure of 
accumulation  in  family  businesses  in  which  the  rights  of  labour  are  avoided  and 
evaded as assiduously as are tax obligations. 
 
However, the social realist economist Tony Lawson has made a case we cannot ignore 
that there is one changing reality with many theories of it, each of which are not only 
part  of  this  reality  but  partial  in  their  scope  (Lawson,  2003).    Ester  Boserup’s 
argument is steeped in modernisation theory. Its conceptual currency is the deepening 
of the division of labour, the advent of factory production  and the definition of a rural 
sector different from that of towns. It fails to examine the specifically capitalist logic 
of this process. This has now been innovatively theorised in a general way by Ursula 
Huws  (2004).  In  the  second  part  of  this  essay,  her  theory  of  gendered 
commodification under capitalist production relations is developed in an application 




4. Capitalist Commodification 
“ It is a law, based on the very nature of manufacture,.. that the transformation of the 
social  means  of  production  and  subsistence  must  keep  extending.”  (Marx,  1999 
(1867) p222). 
 
In the second part of this essay, we build on the exploration of the changes in gender 
relations, which occur while rice is commercialised and while the technologies of 
processing are ‘modernised’, to an examination of the gendering of the process of 
commodification of rice in India. To help us do this, we will introduce and develop 
the theory of capitalist commodification offered by the feminist sociologist of labour, 
Ursula Huws. Capital does not only ‘keep extending’ according to a logic of expanded 
reproduction, which requires a continual increase in consumption  and investment and 
which leads to both the concentration and centralisation of capital. Huws suggests that 
capital also ‘keeps extending’ by non-stop commodification.  
 
The process of commodification involves a sequence of relations, the first few of 
which  are  familiar  from  Boserup’s  account.  First,  un-valorised  productive  and 
reproductive tasks are carried out for their essential usefulness – their use value. They 
are then replaced by craft work for sale and/or by paid services. In turn these are 
replaced by mass produced commodities in conditions with economies of scale. In the 
process workers are deskilled. New mechanisms of control ‘taylorise’ the production 
of  these  goods.  These  commodities  in  turn  require  new  services.  These  are  also 
industrialised,  involving  further  de-skilling  along  with  the  managerialisation  of 
professional  services.  Each  wave  of  commodification  is  accompanied  by  new 
technology. This new technology is not immiserising or labour displacing, because of 
the creation of new commodities including commoditised forms of services which 
require  labour.  This  demand  continually  stimulates  the  labour  market.    As  a 
consequence of this process, the home is transformed from a site of production of use QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 12 
   
value to a site of the consumption of commodities (op.cit. p18). But not quite – and 
not only.  
 
First,  since  capital  strips  itself  of  all  unprofitable  tasks,  new  forms  of  work 
(unvalorised tasks / work for use value) are loaded onto the consumer.
32  Huws adopts 
the term consumption work for this activity and argues convincingly, after Gershuny, 
that this process of industrialisation of domestic work does not increase leisure time.
33 
This is because when the wage is no longer a family wage, women have to work in 
order to pay for the ever wider range of reproductive technologies in commodity form 
which replace production for use (including pleasure). Public goods and services and 
profoundly influential ideologies of cleanliness, pleasure, and of women as providers 
of  domestic  peace  and  care  all  make  it  difficult  for  people  not  to  possess  these 
‘reproductive commodities’ (wet grinders, fridges, washing machines, etc). Due to the 
home being a special site where these commodities are owned either individually or 
by  the  corporate  household,  there  will  be  a  structural  excess  capacity  in  them 
nationwide.  As  the  division  of  labour  and  the  process  of  reproductive 
commodification  deepens,  consumers  have  increasingly  less  knowledge  about  the 
commodities  they  use  and  the  commodities  themselves  also  become  increasingly 
dangerous  (op.cit.  pp  44-45).  From  this  transformed  consumption  work  evidently 
come  requirements  for  yet  more  specialised  services,  which  themselves  become 
commodified  e.g.  the  semi-automated  systems  for  the  repair  and  maintenance  of 
domestic appliances organised for European consumers via call centres in India  – and 
so the cycle of commodification and transformed consumption work continues. 
 
Second, since capital always searches for the lowest cost and most docile labour, the 
home becomes a new site of wage work and of the production of commodities (op.cit. 
p33). IT enables the control of out-sourcing and creates new forms of alienation  - 
under which the worker may own the means of production, the machine, while the 
terms of work are still set by the employer.  
 
There are, at the least, two consequences relevant to the argument about gender and 
rice processing in South Asia which has been developed in the first part of this essay. 
First the new technology displaces jobs disproportionately allocated to women (in 
Huws’ European case studies, these are clerical jobs). It leads to the degradation of 
work (due to the reductive nature of commodity production : physically repetitive, 
mentally restricting and constraining social relations).  It also leads to conditions in 
which  it  is  very  difficult  to  organise  labour,  and  to  job  losses  (as  outsourcing  is 
spatially and socially relocated). Second, this isolated wage work has implications for 
the  physical  and  mental  health  of  (women)  workers  stuck  in  precisely  the  same 
process  that  requires  them  to  be  ever  more  central  to  the  provision  of  domestic 
harmony.  Huws  calls  this  the  Taylorisation  of  domestic  life  (op.cit.,  ch  11).  The 
increasingly  frequent  breakdown  of  the  family  unit  exacerbates  the  condition  of 
                                                 
32 Huws gives examples of collecting goods from supermarket shelves; bagging your own vegetables; 
self-service auto fuel stations; automatic cash dispensers (op cit. p27). 
33 Leisure, which used to be spent creatively – such as the enjoyment of active music-making – has 
been completely replaced by pleasure-consumption packaged through commodities such as TVS, CDs, 
Ipods, etc. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 13 
   
women; and these conditions persuade a small but growing number of women (and 
men) not to form families at all
34. 
 
While  the  theoretical  focus  of  Huws’  analysis  is  the  working  household  under 
advanced  capitalism,  Huws  herself  makes  global  connections  between  the  twin 
processes of commodification and accumulation and the search for cheap labour, the 
outsourcing of production and the transfer of (cyber-) work to women of different 
classes (as in highly educated call centre labour in India) and/or different stages of life 
(as with unmarried women in Bangladesh and China) and in conditions where rights 
at work and rights to social security are absent (as in sweatshops everywhere). 
 
In certain ways, Huws’ theory resembles Boserup’s theory, but their predictions are 
different.  Both  are  concerned  with  female  agency  in  the  context  of  threatening 
processes.  Both  describe  the  process  of  industrialisation  of  craft  production  but 
Boserup  argues  that  the  productive  labour  involved  is  progressively 
disproportionately male whereas Huws reasons that the waves of commodification use 
female  wage  workers  not  only  in  factory  production  but  also  sited  at  home.  For 
Boserup, if women in agrarian societies are educated, their education does not result 
in    mass  entry  into  the  labour  force,  quite  the  reverse.  Women  are  forced 
progressively  into  the  condition  of  ‘productive  deprivation’.  Boserup    argues  that 
productive deprivation creates ‘domestic tension’. Huws not only acknowledges such 
tension  in  principle,  but  deconstructs    the  social  tensions  resulting  from  the 
transformation of the purposes of the home (first from the site of production-for-use 
to the site of consumption; and then in addition to the site of women’s wage work).  
 
Do their predictions differ because developing countries (Boserup) are different from 
advanced ones (Huws), because Boserup wrote in 1972 and Huws in the subsequent 
decades, or because Boserup analyses neither capitalism nor commodification? Rice 
is one of the key nutrient bases for the global system of commodification theorised by 




4.1 Theorising commodification under conditions of mass poverty 
Let us try to extend Huws’ insights to conditions of mass labour force poverty in 
developing countries such as India. As was discussed in section 3.1, women occupy a 
range of class positions. The structure of the difference between gender and class and 
its implications for labour market supply have  been theorised   - for North  Indian 
conditions - by Kalpana Bardhan (1993). To summarise, first in the capitalist class 
women  are  defined  through  kinship  norms  and  practices  of  village  exogamy  and 
caste-hypergamy. These deprive women of regular support from their natal families. 
Work in the family business is sex-segmented and women are secluded, such that 
their income and price elasticity of supply is zero. However, their compliant and pious 
                                                 
34 There is a third, though Huws does not explicitly develop this. The speed and comprehensivity of 
this process means that elderly people can no longer be a repository of useful experience.  While Huws 
sees elderly people as part of women’s burden of care, it can be argued that the ‘retired’ body is also 
yet another fertile field or object of commodification. 
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behaviour affects the business family’s commercial reputation 
35. This in turn shapes 
returns from the real economy, for example: access to credit for working capital and 
access  to  investment  capital  through  resource  flows  in  marriage  alliances.  While 
women are not exploited, health and demographic analysis shows only too well that 
they may be oppressed. 
 
Bardhan then turns to consider the working peasantry, where women may organise 
the hiring-in and out of labour and may supervise production. Their status within a 
household  will  affect  their  supply  to  the  labour  market.  Third,  in  labouring 
households, uxorilocal marriage means a woman has access to support from her natal 
family but she (like her husband) is exploited by capitalist men through wage work. 
Of all the class sites discussed here, her elasticity of supply is highest. The working 
woman, by reproducing wage labour across the generations also supplies a ‘subsidy’ 
(however one which cannot be valued) to the capitalist. Exploited in her own wage 
work (perhaps as a domestic servant or agricultural labourer) she is also commonly 
vulnerable to sexual oppression from capitalist men. Hence a woman’s experience of 
oppression is primarily from the capitalist class and only secondarily from relations 
within the working class household.  
 
Clearly then, in Indian conditions it is not the case that ‘robots don’t buy cars’ (Huws, 
2004, p26), it is that the structures of exploitation and oppression which are mapped 
onto labour supply prevent poor working people, especially poor working women, 
from ‘buying cars’. Nor can they buy wet grinders. And while poor working women 
do not have individual purchasing power for the so-deceptive ‘labour saving’ devices 
central  to  Huws’  theory,  some  bourgeois  women  have  had  those  labour-saving 
devices purchased for domestic use  - and some for display and status. So a proportion 
of  women  from  the  capitalist  and  professional  ancillary  classes  in  developing 
countries (possibly those reading this essay) are available for capital and the state, go 
to work and are captured in - and by  - exactly the process Huws theorises for working 
women in advanced countries. The majority of unemployed bourgeois women (with 
or without labour saving devices) still transform consumption work into petty services 
paid for by the surplus value which is extracted and redistributed by men. The home is 
then a site not only of production for use/production for exchange (by men) but also 
of demand for, and consumption of, reproductive services (superficially expressed by 
women in the division of domestic bourgeois labour but using money got by men). 
This demand is often but not exclusively for female domestic wage labour. In labour 
surplus economies, petty production and petty services are then built solidly into the 
structure  of  commodification  even  when  they  face  direct  competition  from 
commodity and factory production – exactly the conditions which have been widely 
predicted to destroy petty production
36.  
 
Just  as  well;  because  the  multipliers  from  waves  of  Huws-style  commodification  
involve technological transfers from economies with different ‘factor proportions’ to 
those of societies with labour surpluses. The extent to which the process of capitalist 
accumulation  triggered  by  commodification  generates  the  kind  of    jobless  growth 
                                                 
35A family’s credit in business ‘is its stock in the broadest sense, which includes social position, its 
reputation and the moral and religious as well as the business conduct of all its members’ (Laidlaw, 
1995, p355) 
36Along with the peasantry and the  ‘opium of the masses’ (Marx 1990 p595) QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 15 
   
much discussed in the Indian literature on trade liberalisation sets further distinctive 
limits on the Huws-style process of commodification.   
 
In  sum:  in  developing  countries,  the  irony  is  that    poor  labour-market  returns  
constrain, though they do not prevent,  both a Boserup style process of productive 
deprivation and a Huws style process of waves of commodification broadly centred 
on the home. Instead, a remarkably stable structure of demand is created for services 
and  basic  ‘wage  goods’  either  produced  or  supplied  under  conditions  of  petty 
production. Let us put the most basic wage good under the lens of commodification.  
 
5.  Commodification and De-commodification in the Post Harvest System for 
Rice 
 
In the absence of other research, suggestive evidence from my own work in West 
Bengal in 1982, 1990 and 2000-2 will be used to illustrate. Figure 1 shows the result 
of over two decades of institutional involution in the systems of local petty trade 
centred on huller (husking) mills and long distance (state mediated) trade through the 
rice mills.  During this period, growth rates for rice production doubled for about a 
decade and then declined
37.  West Bengal went from being a rice deficit state to self 
sufficiency in 1993 and surplus thereafter. 
  
Figure 1 shows that large numbers of new livelihoods have appeared during the past 
decade or so: new village level sub-agents for paddy brokers, new petty parboiling 
firms, new petty milling operations, new petty post-milling rice puffing firms and new 
itinerant traders of rice. Family firms have started to employ labour at a number of 
sites  over the last 15 years, in freight and haulage, huller/husking mills and newly 
decentralised wholesale-cum-retail firms. New rental markets have appeared where 
the  owners  of  huller  mills  have  invested  in  mini  drying  yards  and  parboiling 
machinery.    The  process  of  commodification  of  products  also  grinds  ineluctably 
onwards. Rice is differentiated not only through varieties (which are still diverse  - 
though showing signs of a reduction in the range of cultivars) but also through types 
of  pre-  and  post-milling  processing  for  raw  rice,  several  kinds  of  parboiled  rice, 
puffed dry rice (muri) and rice flour ground from the 2% of rice which emerges from 
milling  in  broken  forms.    Even  waste  is  commodified  for  recycling
38;  even  small 
stones, used as adulterants have been commercialised for re-adulteration.  
 
One by-product, rice mill husk, is no longer traded as an organic manure but is now 
recycled as a fuel for steam exchangers in rice mills. New specialist markets have 
developed for any surplus husk.
39  The by-product of the commodified by-product 
(burnt rice mill husk) is also being commercialised as a raw material for both the high 
tech silica industry and for low-tech brick kilns. Specialised firms are developing to 
supply each kind of industry. Another by-product (rice mill bran) is the basis of a 
relatively highly capitalised and large-scale oil extracting industry. This commodity, 
oil, has only recently been declared fit for human consumption. Previously it was an 
intermediate good for the production of detergents and paints. The by-product of this 
                                                 
37See Rogaly et al 1999 for the debate over growth rates 
38Beall 1997 
39 Husk in rural huller milling is not yet commodified and retained for domestic parboiling and cooking 
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So rice now enters the food system to be consumed as rice, cooking oil and meat.  
 
New technology may be gendered in ways which have perverse effects. The next stage 
of  technical  change  in  agro-commerce  -  automation  -  urgently  requires 
computerisation. In small-town S. India, local women who have obtained relevant 
qualifications have until very recently been debarred (on declared grounds of gender) 
from computer operation on commercial premises. The agro-commercial elite rejects 
the female gendering of high-tech work, located socially and physically above their 
male (family) labour force. The diffusion of automation has therefore been hindered 
and computerisation has been confined to the kind of simple accounting operations, 
which can be learned by trial and error by under-educated and uncommodified male 
family labour.  
 
By contrast obsolete technology is not rejected but instead feeds second-hand markets, 
well evinced in the thriving market for majestic cast–off steam engines (some from 
the Indian Railways) which are converted for husk firing.  
 
The process is definitely not yet as multiplicative of derived, specialised, professional 
services such as advertising, insurance, legal and accounting advice as in advanced 
capitalist  economies.  The  repair  and  maintenance  of  mill  machinery  is  not  being 
commodified as a specialist service sector .
41 
  
5. 1  The commodification of state regulative services 
In  contemporary peripheral capitalist societies, just as elsewhere, the sphere of public 
goods and services is being privatised and commodified. This is only possible because 
public goods and services are not confined to non-rivalrous and non-excludable goods 
and services but include those about which there has been a justified public consensus 
that they be provided by the public sector for non-commercial reasons. The process 
has  been  theorised  by  Leys  (2001).    Public  services  are  reconfigured  as  standard 
commodities; service providers are reduced to wage labour from which surplus can be 
extracted;  the expression of public service values has to be  converted into demand 
for  commodities  and  the  state  acts  to  underwrite  the  risk  to  capital  of  this 
transformation. Under this process  (dominated by big business, and, thanks to WTO 
rules, increasingly by MNCs) labour is being displaced throughout the capitalist world 
system.  However,  this  process  is  always  constrained  by  the  limited  proportion  of 
society that can afford ‘open’ market prices for commodified public goods, or ‘user 
fees’ for privatised services. The privatisation of public goods and services always has 
regressive outcomes.
42  In the  Indian rice system, the public distribution system is 
under attack from a process of commodification which takes many forms 
43.  The 
                                                 
40 Most bran from huller mills however, is lost to the agro-industrial system and is retained in villages 
for animal and poultry feed.   
41 Instead, due to poor infrastructure, physical and tele-communications, it remains internalised into the 
labour process of individual firms. 
42State interventions such as the Public Distribution System or Noon meal Schemes have been found to 
be socially progressive transfers (Harriss-White, 2004b) . Educated and skilled labour then plays its 
role as the ‘global reserve army’ (Kaplinsky, 2003) or is let loose unprepared and unprotected in the 
bear garden of the informal economy (Breman, 2003). 
43Well addressed in Swaminathan, 2000 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 17 
   
most obvious is the planned privatisation of publicly owned storage. Another form of 
attack is deliberately planned market convergence  - as when the price of administered 
foodgrain prices for all but BPL households becomes asymptotic to market prices. Yet 
another attack consists of barriers to off-take by poor households, exemplified by the 
large  size  of  the  limiting  consignments  which  poor  households  may  purchase  on 
subsidy. 
 
When the state abnegates its responsibilities, markets substitute for the defective or 
absent supply of public goods and services. Sometimes they take petty forms, e.g. the 
night watch - when property is insecure - or the private disposal of industrial waste – 
when public hygiene is poorly provided. But they may also be organised on a large 
scale,  e.g.  the  production  and  sale  of  diesel  engines  to  substitute  for  fickle  state 
electricity. The process of substitution for state failure carries with it no necessary 
implications  for  scale.  Where  the  state  does  not  implement  its  own  regulatory 
interventions, institutions of collective regulation also fill the normative vacuum and 
create authority for market order. To the extent that this authority requires resources 
and skilled and specialised labour, the parallel system of regulation then follows the 
inexorable logic of commodification. Commodification also proceeds  apace in the 
informalised  and  illegal  markets  for  public  goods  and  services.  Conventionally 
theorised in terms of rent-seeking, leakages from fraud/plunder far exceed those due 
to  corruption  (Roy,  1996).  Tax-liable  resources  fraudulently  retained  will  further 
lubricate the process of commodification. For example, even in the ‘liberalising’ post-
harvest rice system, the most common and enduring of such markets are those for 
grain ‘leaked’ in transport or from storage, or never exported as planned, or seeping 
into parallel markets from the differences between official milling outturn ratios and 
higher  actual  ones
44.    However,  by  far  the  more  significant  phenomena  are  the 
criminal markets  developed for capital flight and black finance (Srinivasan, 2004). 
Though Arun Kumar argues that such phenomena are concentrated at the top of the 




5.2   The gendered nature of commodification in rice processing 
In the post-harvest rice system it is only the homes of the propertied commercial elite 
and elite consumers of rice which are turned into a site of consumption of Huws-style 
‘reproductive commodities’. The systemic commodification we have described here is 
not  sited  in  the  home  but  in  workshops  (where  the  work  is  scaled–up  and  more 
specialised than bari production) or in mills/ factories where skills are differentiated. 
While work conditions are harsh and while labour is certainly next to impossible to 
organise 
46, in neither case to date is work desocialised as it is depicted in Huws-style 
commodification. The impact of commodification is well established : a heavy double 
burden  of  productive  and  reproductive  work  with  deleterious  implications  not  so 
much  for  women’s  mental  health  (due  to  isolation,  as  theorised  by  Huws)  as  for 
physical health
47. Even here there is an additional burden, for women not only endure 
their own ill health, they are the prime providers of care at times of  disability or ill 
health of other family members and migrant workers forced to return with occupation-
                                                 
44See Mooij, 1999, for detailed evidence for Karnataka and Kerala 
45 Kumar 1999; Roy 1996; Khan and Jomo 2001; Harriss-White 2003 
46 Mills are polluted and drying yards involve back breaking work in hot sunshine. 
47Elson 1995; Jackson and Palmer Jones 1998, Bhushan, 2003 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 18 
   
related accidents and illness 
48. They perform the ‘help in time of need’ that the state 




The proliferation of livelihoods (producing or trading new products, by products and 
informalised products) in the involuting rice system appears from the limited evidence 
for West Bengal and North India to generate wage work and self-employment mostly 
to  young  men  of  low  caste.  The  system  is  financed  through  a  cascade  of  money 
advances from commercial capital. Where family labour is used, women are for the 
most part reported as under the control of men. It is only when men migrate for work 
that  women  emerge  as  managers  of  the  household’s  residual  productive  assets 
50. 
Women retain prominent roles in petty retailing.  Lacking collateral, they also lack 
access to banks and thus remain dependent clients of male rice wholesalers, their 
capacity to accumulate independently constrained (Choudhury, 2001).  As a result of 
the  polarised  accumulation  trajectories  created  by  commodification,  de-oiled  bran 
cake, fed to European cattle, and basmati rice wholesaled in Europe can be confected 
into a ready made meal for consumers in relatively food secure Europe, while the 
Orissan or Bihari woman supporting the family of the migrant worker in the bran 




In  sum:  Indian  rice  markets  reveal  both  Boserup’s  and  Huws’  theories  as  being 
partial.  In  both  cases  what  they  exclude  limits  their  social  relevance  and  their 
predictions.  Boserup  conceptualised  neither  commodification  nor  capitalism,  while 
Huws has not yet focussed on gendered commodification under conditions of low 
returns to labour. Huws’ focus on the repeated waves of commodification centred 
around the home enables her to examine its far reaching impact on the household, 
changes in women’s work, and the different conditions which ‘make a cybertariat’ in 
centres of advanced capitalism and in peripheral capitalist societies like India’s. But 
although that is where it ends, her theory is rich enough to be developed in several 
new  directions.    In  particular,  from  the  material  discussed  here,  a  link  can  be 
established  between  commodification  and  the  combination  of  petty  commodity 
production  and  commercial  capital  that  is  a  persistent  feature  of  the  capitalist 
accumulation through which the process unfolds in India.
51   
 
6. Conclusions 
The object of this essay was not to examine commodification across all reproductive 
commodities in India but in the most basic one of all : rice. The evidence we have 
marshalled shows that the combination of masculinisation and productive deprivation 
is confined to the one class where the reproductive commodities (which both generate 
Huws-type  commodification  and  result  from  it)  are  being  amassed.  Economically 
                                                 
48Erb and Harriss-White, 2002; Rogaly et al 2002 
49 Old age is defined by rural people in terms of the needs generated by incapacity/disability;  and the 
harsh conditions of work in the post harvest system brings on old age at ages far below that of the 
Indian state’s stingy Old Age Pension which is 60 years. 
50Coppard 2004; Mosse 2004 
51 Three forces can be seen to drive this process:, the differentiation of demand (carefully constructed, 
in India as elsewhere, through the media, advertising etc); the state-backed import, transfer and 
adaptation of technology; and relations of corruption and fraud (see Harriss, 2003). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 19 
   
powerful and sizable in absolute terms, this class is relatively small in comparison 
with the total population. This class also generates demand for petty services and 
petty commodity production. 
 
Rampant commodification can be observed throughout the post harvest system for 
rice, even under conditions of mediocre growth in production - involving investment 
goods  and  technologies,  intermediate  goods,  labour,  products,  informalised  public 
goods, by-products, waste, adulterants and regulative resources.  The forms taken by 
this  commodification  are  highly  varied.  New  forms  of  advanced  capitalist 
organisation  co-exist  stably  with  older  forms,  alongside  an  obstinately  persisting 
production for direct use, driven by poverty. A range of technologies co-exist; a range 
of  laws (of selectively limited reach) and informalised procedures, of social norms 
and institutions co-exist to regulate this process. These are the characteristics of a 
market economy which is socially- as well as state-  regulated.  
 
In this process, commodities show all signs of becoming standardised. However, they 
are far from always being the mass products of factories (though steam and diesel 
engines,  rice  mill  machinery  and  some  rice  certainly  are  produced  in  factory 
conditions).  In  many  cases  a  commodified  good  produced  at  home  using  family 
labour competes with an identical one produced in a factory using wage labour. What 
is more, a given task is performed by wage labour with varying rights at work and 
rights to social security, under a range of contracts and wages. In a socially regulated 
economy, the segmentation of markets may be such that competition between these 
forms  of  labour  process  may  not  take  place  at  all.  If  it  does,  it  requires  market 
preconditions  where  scale  economies  in  factory  production  compete  directly  with 
unwaged labour in petty production. 
 
Gender is a social structure crucial to the viability of the space for petty production 
since it is the services which are the outcome of women’s agency under exploitive and 
oppressive conditions that both under-write and constrain bourgeois commodification. 
It  is  their  unwaged  work  that  is  pitted  against  the  economies  of  scale  reaped  by 
capitalist enterprise employing wage workers
52.   
 
The  recognition  of  the  gendering  of    petty  production  carries  with  it  some 
conundrums for policy.  On the one hand, if working women were to demand an end 
to state-subsidies for the production of ‘reproductive commodities’, the competitive 
advantage of petty production would be boosted.  On the other hand, the moment 
women and children in family enterprises were to start to demand minimum wages, 
petty production (and male household heads) would be thrown into crisis. One can 
safely predict that every attempt will be made to prevent either claim from happening. 
The state may have an interest in preventing the former, since the actually existing 
state has long been embroiled in a ‘market driven politics’ 
53 in which capital seeks to 
seize incentives, such as subsidies, and to resist all disciplinary regulation.
54  It may 
have  an  interest  in  preventing  the  latter,  since  in  an  era  with  zero  or  negative 
                                                 
52In the regulation of wage work, non-local (migrant) men of low social status occupy similar positions 
to women (Vijaybaskar, 2003; Rogaly et al 2000, 2002, Rogaly , 2003). 
 
53 The phrase is Leys, 2001 
54 See Chibber, 2003 , for big family business and corporate capital and Harriss-White 2003, for 
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elasticities of labour absorption, the petty sector is increasingly crucial to electoral  
legitimacy. Bereft of a coherent development project for petty production, the state 
(re)labels  it as  ‘the tiny sector’ , ‘self employment’ , ‘micro-enterprise’, ‘micro-
credit’, ‘livelihoods’, ‘self-help groups’ etc.  Although interventions proliferate, by 
taking this ad hoc approach, the state’s regulative and welfare responsibilities towards 
labour  can  be  reduced  to  highly  selective  patronage  and  its  infrastructural 
responsibilities toward business and capital can be minimised.   
My  final  conclusion  concerns  the  theoretical  situation  of  gender  relations.  While 
Huws has focussed on what commodification does to women (and to gender relations) 
in the sphere of consumption  and at work ‘at home’ and around the home, gender is 
one  of  a  set  of  non-class,  non-state  ways  in  which  capitalism  is  instituted  or 
structured. Other prominent structures are ethnicity, caste, religion, nation, locality, 
language, age and the life-cycle. Feminist scholarship has been very successful in 
mapping capitalism, and now commodification, onto gender and vice versa.  
 
Gender actually intersects with these other social institutions to regulate markets and 
structure  accumulation.  In  this  essay,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  explore  the 
intersection between rice processing, gender, class and the state. Laurence Pujo has 
started  to  theorise  the  intersection  of  gender  with  other  institutions,  using  her 
experience with the gendered rice markets of Guinee.
55 Locality and ethnicity vary in 
their significance and regulate the economy in different ways at different scales of 
aggregation.  With  respect  to  locality,  information  and  access  to  capital  is  heavily 
urban and male biased. Ethnicity in business is a strong entry barrier particularly to 
women – even in a marketing system which Boserup deemed to be ‘female’. Little is 
known  about  the  ways  in  which  divine  authority  and  the  practices  attributed  to 
religious groups regulate the process of commodification,  gender relations and the 
control of women  - and  the sites of production, distribution, consumption/demand 
and  reproduction.  Pujo  observes  that  allegiance  to  religion  structures  network 
transactions and may also lead to contractual behaviour which differs among co- and 
non- religionists. While kinship alliances affect entry to marketing systems, less is 
known about the role of the life cycle in market behaviour. Pujo found that women 
gain independence with age and can accumulate at a faster pace; however the great 
majority  of  women  stop  trading  altogether  when  their  dependents  leave  the 
households (Pujo, 1997, pp291-301). 
 
If, with the understanding of feminists, gender were to be seen as a special case of  the 
general  phenomenon  of  the  non-class,  non-state  power  structures  through  which 
commodification and class relations are constructed, then how do we theorise the sites 
and  the  spaces  in  which  the  other  institutions  work,  as  Huws  and  other  feminist 
theorists have done with gender and the spheres of consumption and production? How 
to relate the emancipatory  and oppressive practices expressed through all these major 
social institutions? How to establish their roles in market exchange? Until this work is 
done it is impossible to develop a general understanding of the social regulation of the 
economy. Nor, with few exceptions, have these institutions or structures been related 
systematically to the practices of the state and the realms of policy. Formulated in 
terms  neutral  to  these  structures  (unless  intended  purposively  to  transform  them) 
policy in practice works through them. It is due both to the ethnocentricity and to the 
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reductive nature of economics that these theoretical, practical and political questions 
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TABLE 1 
THE GENDERED PRODUCTION OF RICE, 1980s, S. India 
 
Livelihoods per annual output of 81.60 tonnes of rice 







0.2-0.8 tonnes per hr 
30 (M)  60 (M)  302 (F) 
Modern Rice Mill 2-3 
tonnes per hour 
28 (M)  68 (M)  90 (M) 
Source:  Harriss and Kelly, 1982 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 23 
   
 
TABLE 2 









Total  Total 
Number 




1.  Andhra 
Pradesh 
21.20  8.16  59.76  100.00  21744  15.61 
2.  Assam  -  -  -  -  2820  2.02 
3.  Bihar  97.48  1.29  1.05  100.00  4872  3.50 
4.  Gujarat  59.79  -  33.06  100.00  3161  2.27 
5.  Haryana  44.91  -  55.09  100.00  1797  1.29 
6.  Himachal 
Pradesh 
-  -  -  -  1116  0.88 
7.  Jammu  & 
Kashmir 
-  -  -  -    @ 
8.  Karnataka  63.54  3.21  25.56  100.00  14370  10.32 
9.  Kerala  84.29  -  15.62  100.00  16210  11.64 
10.  Madhya 
Pradesh 
63.79  3.27  28.67  100.00  6142  4.41 
11.  Maharashtra  76.11  2.53  16.33  100.00  10772  7.76 
12.  Manipur  -  -  -  -  1498  1.08 
13.  Meghalaya  -  -  -  -  260  0.18 
14.  Nagaland  -  -  -  -    @ 
15.  Orissa  86.88  1.70  7.50  100.00  7364  5.29 
16.  Punjab  64.72  6.47  28.80  100.00  6823  4.90 
17.  Rajasthan  -  -  -  -  353  0.25 
18.  Sikkim  100.00  -  -  100.00  17  @ 
19.  Tamil Nadu  70.61  2.31  20.24  100.00  19378  13.91 
20.  Tripura  -  -  -    1045  0.75 
21.  Uttar Pradesh  72.85  7.17  18.06  100.00  7834  5.62 
22.  West Bengal  90.51    8.77  100.00  10555  7.58 
23.  Andaman  & 
Nicobar 
-  -  -  -  116  @ 
24.  Chandigarh  -  -  -  -  27  @ 
25.  Delhi          9  @ 
26  Goa          751  0.54 
27  Pondichery  -  -  -  -  234  0.17 
Number  91287  4538  35088    139298                 
Total  Percent  65.53  3.26  25.19  100.00    100.00 
 
@ Number insignificant 
 
Source: Report of the Ministry of Food Processing Industry, 2002; Kaur 2004 
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TABLE 3: IMPACT OF MECHANICAL DRYING , W. Bengal 
Livelihoods per Rs 1 crore of gross output (2002) 





Family  (M)  1  1   - 
Permanent  Lb 
(M) 
4  2  -50 
Casual Lb (M)  1.5  2  +33 
Casual Lb (F)  12.4  0.3  -98 
Processing  Time 
(hrs) 
72-120  12-24   
Source : data in Ghosh and Sudarshan, 2004 
 
TABLE 4: Employment Structure in Rice Processing (Punjab)  
Sr.No. 
 
  Number  Per cent of the total 
1.  Regular Family (management)  6160  4.29 
2.  Regular (but not permanent) Employees: 







  b. With only PF facility  7000  4.87 
3.  Seasonal Employees 
(without any benefits) 
19000  13.22 
4.  Unskilled Daily Wage Workers  105000  73.08 
5.  Sub-total (Formal Sector Workers)  138378  96.31 
5.  Seasonal Family Workers in Informal sector 
units 
5800  3.69 
6.  Total  143678  100.00 
Source: Survey of Rice Processing Industry, Kaur 2004 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 25 
   
 
TABLE 5: 
Male Livelihoods in Rice Mills in Punjab  2002 per unit 
 






MRM  on 










1-2  3-5  -  3-7  40,000-
112,000 
(MRM) 




-  10-20  -  10-15  35-50 
Security 
staff 
-  4-6  -  4-6  20-30 
Machine 
Maintenance 
and  Skilled 
Labour 




1-5  20-30  20-50  30-50  17-84  (Co-
op) 
Capacity 
(tonnes  per 
hour) 
0.2-0.5  3-7  4  1-2   
  
Source:  data  in  Kaur,  2004QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 26 
   
 
APPENDIX : THE POST HARVEST PROCESSING OF RICE  
 
The milling of rice involves removing the outer layer of husk and the intermediate 
layer of bran. The milling outturn varies from 60-69% depending on the pre-milling 
processing, the milling technology, the moisture of the paddy and the degree of polish 
required. 
 
The tasks associated with paddy milling vary widely. At one extreme is the custom 
mill, processing 0.2 tonnes per hour with one pass for a fee; in which the byproducts 
are retained by the owner of the consignment. At the other extreme is the modern rice 
mill (MRM). Paddy is passed through mechanical driers or sun-dried down to 12-14 
% moisture. Dust, stones and other adulterants are removed, paddy is milled using a 
rubber roll sheller, rice is polished, graded and packaged, while husk and bran are 
separated. 
 
In  Eastern  India  and  regions  supplying  Eastern  India,  paddy  may  be  par-boiled 
according to a range of techniques, prior to drying and milling. In general it is soaked 
prior either to steaming or boiling. Parboiling gelatinizes the starch, making the grain 
translucent,  hard  and  resistant  to  breakages  during  milling.  As  a  result  milling 
recovery rates for head rice and total rice yields are improved. The rice kernel also 
absorbs oil, vitamins and minerals from the surrounding layer of bran, making it more 
nutritious. 
 
Paddy husk, a by-product in the process, is used as fuel for boiling and mechanical 
drying. Husk from raw rice mills is sold. Other by-products are rice bran, which is 
either returned as animal feed or commercialized as a raw material for solvent oil 
extraction, broken rice (which is sold or crushed or powdered prior to sale) and husk 
ash which is used as an organic fertilizer and a base for cosmetics. (see Kaur, 2004) QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS128  Page 27 
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